Fatal when the enemy is using rifled weapons. But the Civil War generals had to learn that the hard way -- and so did European armies when they fought in the latter half of the 19th Century. Google "Solferino" and "Magenta" sometime.

-- Mal

(I go back tovsleep between breakfast & lunch)
Good to see you back👍

... not an essay on linear tactics.

Another Napoleonic concept that Bobby Lee used extensively was the strategy of the Central Position. This was a natural resort for an army outnumbered and threatened by multiple enemy armies. Hold off one threat while concentrating and destroying the other, then turn on the first. Problem is, despite the horrific casualties, Civil War campaigns almost never resulted in the annihilation of the enemy army (until the very end), so Mr Lee was forced to continually run around in circles putting out fires.

Both sides in the war used Hardee's manual of tactics, which was taught at West Point. Hardee himself fought for the Confederacy, where he attained bare competence and not much more. He based his manual on the linear tactics that had been in vogue for a couple of centuries, not knowing that modern rifled artillery and small arms made the tactics obsolete and downright dangerous.

One of the few Civil War generals on either side who had actually seen modern battle was George McClellan of the US Army, who had been an observer in the Crimea only a decade before. It has been suggested that his experiences there helped to shape his cautious approach, with its emphasis on "Regular Positions" and heavy artillery usage. But then, he was also an engineer by trade (as many of the CW generals were), so such tactics naturally appealed to him. He showed the influence of another Napoleonic strategic concept, the "Indirect Approach," with his plan for the Peninsular campaign, which was actually quite good, verging on brilliant, if only his caution had not slowed its execution once the Army of the Potomac had been concentrated in the Peninsula.

Most of those who attained high rank on either side in the US Civil War had fought in the Mexican War, which was poor preparation for the reality of war in the latter half of the 19th century. There, the romanticized Napoleonic tactics worked well, which encouraged generals to keep using them long after they had been shown to be ineffective. Truly an example of armies expecting to fight the last war in the next one.

As for the "March to the Sea," Billy Sherman was emulating the strategy employed by Winfield Scott to take Mexico City and end the Mexican war, a strategy that prompted no less a personage as the Duke of Wellington to opine "Scott is lost. He is cut off from his supply lines and stranded in enemy territory." Living off the land was something that had been a part of war for centuries, if not millennia. It caused such devastation during the 30 Year's War that countries actually became revolted by it, and instead began employing strategies based on depots and strong lines of communication, which limited operations somewhat (and didn't really help ease the devastation of war on the locals). Generals such as Marlborough and Eugene and Napoleon ignored these strategies and made rapid, decisive advances that totally baffled their enemies who were tied to their supply lines.

-- Mal