Gun Control Reform Activism

This is a ridiculous comment haysberry makes, conflating military weapons with service in a militia. The miller decision, unanimous 8-0 decision, wrote thusly (1 & 2):

No jimmy, ridiculous is denying that service in a militia is military service.

With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view. The Militia which the States were expected to maintain and train is set in contrast with Troops which they [307 U.S. 174, 179] were forbidden to keep without the consent of Congress. The sentiment of the time strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view was that adequate defense of country and laws could be secured through the Militia- civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion.
The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators. These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. ‘A body of citizens enrolled for military discipline.’ And further, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time. my emphasis in boldface.


Even had the second amendment been worded "the right of the militia...." the ridiculously narrow interpretation urged by jimmy the one would still find no support in the Miller decision. That court defined the militia broadly (the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense) and said when called these men would arrive bearing arms supplied by themselves (meaning they had possession of said arms before being arriving for service) and the arms would in common use at the time, and part of the ordianry military equipment (see below).


In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense. Aymette v. State of Tennessee, 2 Humph., Tenn., 154, 158.

jimmy the one, did you read that last sentence before posting earlier?

It takes little effort to find the Aymentte decision. http://www.guncite.com/court/state/21tn154.html

A thousand inventions for inflicting death may be imagined, which might come under the appellation of an "arm" in the figurative (p.159)use of that term, and which could by no possibility be rendered effectual in war, or in the least degree aid in the common defence. Would it not be absurd to contend that a constitutional provision, securing to the citizens the means of their common defence, should be construed to extend to such weapons, although they manifestly would not contribute to that end, merely because, in the hands of an assassin, they might take away life?

The legislature, therefore, have a right to prohibit the wearing, or keeping weapons dangerous to the peace and safety of the citizens, and which are not usual in civilized warfare, or would not contribute to the common defence. The right to keep and bear arms for the common defence is a great political right. It respects the citizens on the one hand and the rulers on the other. And although this right must be inviolably preserved, yet, it does not follow that the legislature is prohibited altogether from passing laws regulating the manner in which these arms may be employed.

To hold that the legislature could pass no law upon this subject, by which to preserve the public peace, and protect our citizens from the terror, which a wanton and unusual exhibition of arms might produce, or their lives from being endangered by desperadoes with concealed arms, would be to pervert a great political right to the worst of purposes, and to make it a social evil, of infinitely a greater extent to society, than would result from abandoning the right itself.

Suppose it were to suit the whim of a set of ruffians to enter the theatre in the midst of the performance, with drawn swords, guns and fixed bayonets, or to enter the church in the same manner, during service, to the terror of the audience; and this were to become habitual; can it be, that it would be beyond the power of the legislature to pass laws to remedy such an evil? Surely not. If the use of arms in this way cannot be prohibited, it is in the power of fifty armed ruffians to break up the churches, and all other public assemblages, where they might lawfully come, and there would be no remedy. But we are perfectly satisfied that a remedy might be applied. The convention in securing the public political right in question, did not intend to take away from the legislature all power of regulating the social relations of the citizens upon this subject. It is true, it is somewhat difficult to draw the precise line where legislation must cease, and where the political right begins, but it is not difficult to state a case where the right of legislation (p.160)would exist. The citizens have the unqualified right to keep the weapon, it being of the character before described, as being intended by this provision. But the right to bear arms is not of that unqualified character. The citizens may bear them for the common defence; but it does not follow, that they may be borne by an individual, merely to terrify the people, or for purposes of private assassination. And as the manner in which they are worn, and circumstances under which they are carried, indicate to every man, the purpose of the wearer, the legislature may prohibit such manner of wearing as would never be resorted to by persons engaged in the common defence.



In short, the broad outlines of the meaning of "arms" in the right to keep and bear arms were laid out both in state court cases and in SCOTUS -well before Heller.